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Issues in the Political Economy of Agricultural 
Biotechnology 
 
DAVID WIELD, JOANNA CHATAWAY and MAURICE BOLO

 
 
 
 
Agricultural biotechnology is typically analyzed critically by means of a political 
ecological focus on the science and its ecological implications – agbio science as a 
radical and ‘non-natural’, break with ‘normal’ trajectories for ‘new plant science’. 
Surprisingly, less attention has been paid to a range of key political economic issues, 
many of which were important in the last big food production technology ‘revolution’, 
the green revolution. This paper will focus on three areas of political economy. First, 
we discuss the corporate drivers of agricultural biotechnology, and examine whether 
these drivers have already set the technology so that it cannot be changed. Second, we 
investigate the present economics and technology of genetic modification in plants, 
and its possible future. Third, we examine empirical evidence for alternative visions 
of the technology. 
 
Keywords: Biotechnology, agriculture, technology drivers, policy alternatives 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agricultural biotechnology, especially transgenetic agri-biotechnology, is often analyzed 
critically through the lens of political ecology. The focus is on the science and its ecological 
implications – agbio science as a radical, and ‘non-natural’, break with ‘normal’ trajectories 
for ‘new plant science’.1 Analyses focus, for example, on the ‘introduction’ of ‘foreign’ genes 
into plants; and on ‘terminator’ genes that will ‘kill’ plants after one season. Arguments in 
this vein also often highlight the monopoly control of big multinationals over both the seed 
and the linked chemicals used to spray the seeds/plants, leading to monopoly control over the 
whole planting system and complete commodity chain from field to plate. 
 
Surprisingly, less attention has been paid to a range of key political economic issues, 
many of which were important in the last big food production ‘revolution’, the green 
revolution. There has been less political economic analysis of differences between agrarian 
producers, notably inequalities among different classes of farmers in access to ‘the benefits’ 
of agricultural-biotechnology. Indeed, there has been a strong eco-populist tendency (to use 
the term of Bernstein and Woodhouse, 2006) to argue that ‘Third World’ farmers will be 
disadvantaged by new GM (genetically modified) technology, with little or no accumulation 
potential for any farmer, anywhere. Instead, all GM technology is portrayed as having 
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 There are some exceptions, for example the Special Issue of Journal of Development Studies, 43(1): 2007, 
edited by Ronald Herring. 
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negative consequences, with no potential for productivity or income improvement except by 
one (Monsanto) or a very few monopolist chemical-seed conglomerates.  
 
A sub-genre of the literature has looked at development dilemmas associated with 
GM technology. Herring (2007a, 4) summarises some of the key concerns of its critics: 
‘Opponents of transgenics argue that it is precisely the most vulnerable people who will be at 
risk; critiques often begin with intellectual property... . Poor farmers, in this view, will be 
crushed by bondage to multinational monopolists’. He emphasizes that ‘these are questions of 
great consequence and are amenable to empirical treatment’, and then posits an opposing 
argument that ‘if [GM] proponents are correct, but critics win politically, the poor would be 
denied significant opportunities for improving their lives’. He goes on to make the oft-
forgotten point that precautionary approaches to slow technology uptake when there are 
major possible risks is not a costless decision: ‘precautionary approaches are therefore not 
costless: the status quo is hardly risk-free for the world’s poor’. 
 
In practice however the debate on transgenics has not followed what Herring calls the 
familiar ‘north-south tectonics’. In the ‘north’ the US has, in the main, embraced transgenics, 
whilst Europe has most decidedly not. In Europe, the gains from non-adoption of transgenics 
are portrayed as not going down a ‘doom-laden’ technological trajectory with massive 
ecological destruction.  
 
Would a more political economic analysis of agricultural biotechnology produce a 
different narrative and point to different options? This paper seeks to suggest at least a partial 
answer, to this question.  We concentrate on the development of agricultural biotechnology 
from the perspective of how it has evolved, and how its applications reflect corporate power 
and strategy. We detail the processes of industrial and technological restructuring and 
accumulation, and consider the science/technology dimensions of this type of production 
technology and some of the social relations and dynamics of its adoption. 
 
We focus on three key areas of political economy. First, we argue that the economic 
drivers of agri-biotechnology have been competitive pressures in a rapidly maturing 
agricultural chemicals industry, with increasing monopolisation, and increased integration of 
the hybrid seeds industry into the agri-chemicals industry, with implications for value-chain 
control. At the same time, the big multinational chemical corporations have separated their 
pharmaceutical from their agri-chemicals businesses, which were tightly integrated only a 
decade ago. We suggest how the production of GM and linked technological changes reflect 
particular processes of accumulation, and ask: has this corporate shaping been so dominant 
that there is no alternative narrative or possible future outcome?  
 
Second, to begin to answer this question requires some analysis of the present 
economics and technology of GM. The technology of genetic modification of plants is still 
seen by scientists as in its infancy and rather crude – it is still described as first generation, 
meaning focused on ‘input traits2’ such as herbicide, insect pest and disease resistance. We 
                                                 
2
 By input trait we mean improvements designed to alter some aspects of production, leaving the end-product 
identical to a conventional variety. The aim is to make farming and agricultural production more efficient at 
least for some groups of farmers.  Output traits on the other hand change the composition of the final product to 
enhance its appeal to consumers, such as improved nutritional content (for example, ‘golden’ rice). The aim is to 
improve the quality of agricultural products and thus their value. Such ‘output trait’ modifications are often 
termed ‘second’ generation GM products. The term ‘third’ generation product is used to describe bio-
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consider: the implications of the long lead times in the process that turns science to new 
products; the relationship to the seeds value-chain, that was dominated by Monsanto and later 
became DuPont’s strategic advantage; the importance of present agri-biotechnology to 
farming; and, the potential of ‘second’ and ‘third’ generation technologies. The focus here, 
then, is: what does GM ‘agri-biotechnology’ offer in terms of agricultural production? What 
are its environmental and economic effects and who gains from them? In short, how 
important is GM agricultural biotechnology for agricultural production now and in the future?  
 
Finally, we examine what evidence exists for alternatives in GM development and 
adoption, public and private, and argue that there is some scope for alternative approaches to 
those of the dominant corporation drivers of GM technology.  
 
THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
Much social and economic research on agri-biotechnology presumes that there is only one, 
inexorable path for the technology and its impact on farming, namely that determined by a 
small group of large multinational agri-chemical and seed firms. A major cross-European 
research project in the late 1990s and early 2000s - Policy Influences on Technologies in 
Agriculture (PITA) - investigated this proposition with a study of research and development 
(R&D) strategies in large and small companies in agri-biotechnology, seeds and chemicals  
and  what shaped those strategies (PITA 2001; Chataway et al 2004; Bijman and Joly 2001).    
 
One key finding of that study was that the motives behind many R&D decisions could 
be linked to the particular and ongoing technology trajectories in individual companies. 
Rather than assuming a particular rate and direction of investment in innovation, the study 
carefully analyzed the reasons why individual companies design particular R&D, innovation 
and merger and acquisition strategies.  Whilst much writing about agricultural biotechnology 
assumes that all private companies, in particular all large multinational companies (MNCs), 
have common objectives and strategies, this research dug deeper into decision making in 
companies and in doing so showed their more diverse approaches to strategy.  
 
The study pinpointed what had recently become a maturing industry, finding it hard to 
identify radical new ways of increasing profit levels. During the 1990s, many agri-chemical 
companies were divested from their corporate parents’ pharmaceutical subsidiaries. This was 
a radical departure, since the big pharmaceuticals and agri-chemicals industries were a tightly 
integrated chemicals-based entity only a decade before. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the 
sector had also seen increasing monopolization, with Hoechst and Schering (AgrEvo), 
Rhone-Poulenc, American Cyanamid, Novartis Crop Protection and Zeneca Agrochemicals 
merging or being acquired to make up what is now the six largest global agri-chemicals 
companies (see Table 1). Over the same period there was increased integration of the hybrid 
seeds industry into the agro-chemicals industry, with rapid commodification and thus impact 
on commodity-chain control
3
.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
manufacture of pharmaceutical products such as ingestible vaccines and other ‘pharma-crops’ containing 
antibodies and proteins. 
 
3
 For example, the development of the GM seeds market has lifted seeds sales growth very significantly faster 
than agri-chemicals sales. Between 2000 and 2008, the GM and conventional seeds market rose by 5.9% 
annually (GM by 19.5% and conventional by 2.1% annually).  
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Chataway et al (2004) suggested that, as the agro-chemical sector became more 
mature during the 1980s, multinationals were searching for a new R&D direction. 
Biotechnology was increasingly seen as one way, if not the only one, to transform their 
fortunes. Companies increased their technological diversity (Granstrand et al, 1997) as a 
means to introduce improved and new products. In all cases companies defined themselves as 
moving towards biotechnology, not merely using biotechnology to develop better chemicals.  
 
A main finding of the PITA project, then, was that companies differed in the extent to 
which they invested in GM technology as a replacement for non-GM technology or as an 
addition to other technological trajectories and product lines. The agricultural biotechnology 
trajectory was the product of a complex political and economic context and of the particular 
circumstances and decisions made by dominant firms. 
 
In particular, Monsanto adopted a radical position with regard to biotechnology in 
large part because of the narrowness of its chemical technologies and product base. Table 1 
illustrates that Monsanto still remains weaker in agro-chemical sales than the largest 
European-headquartered agrichemicals firms, but is now easily the world’s largest 
proprietary seed producer. Monsanto was the early leader in plant biotechnology, throwing 
itself wholeheartedly behind the technology. In a sense it had less to lose from investment in 
biotechnology than the bigger agri-chemicals firms since it had a very narrow technological 
base with a large proportion of its profit coming from one chemical - its glysophate herbicide, 
Round-Up. The R&D strategy of developing GM crops resistant to Glysophate, and also 
developing GM induced insect resistance based on Bacillus Thurigeinisis (Bt) genes, fitted 
well with a company that had significant herbicide market share but little presence in 
insecticides. Monsanto’s technological leadership was cemented by its aggressive 
acquisitions strategy.  It acquired a group of seeds and biotechnology companies with 
investment in 1998 alone more than $4bn. (Monsanto Annual Report 1998, 11). 
 
Most other firms had more to lose from a technology whose main marketing attraction 
was lower chemical use, since they were predominantly chemicals firms with broad 
portfolios of agri-chemicals products whose sale volumes would decrease if the claims for 
GM technology were borne out. Indeed, the value of agri-chemical sales of the top six 
companies in 2007 (made up of the top ten companies in 1996) with 74 percent of the global 
market in 2007 rose by just 14 percent, from $25.2bn to $28.8bn, in those 11 years. The other 
companies moved more slowly than Monsanto and in different ways. Novartis, for example, 
developed a less radical but broader strategy, based on food and feed chain innovation, the 
incremental integration of biotechnology, and a focus on crops that it knew well. Zeneca, 
later to join with Novartis, focused more on output traits than input traits. Its research 
included nutritional characteristics of cereal crops, and incorporation of effects that it could 
sell as beneficial to consumers and their health. The prime early example was a tomato paste 
made from tomatoes genetically modified to ripen slowly in the field and to stay ripe for 
longer to assist processing and improve flavour (Flavr savr). It was labelled as GM on 
European shelves and sold well for a period until the anti-GM movement grew. Other 
companies delayed moves to buy seeds businesses until later. DuPont moved into seeds in a 
huge way with its take-over of Pioneer Hi-Bred in 1999. Bayer took over Aventis in 2001 and 
BASF moved late, but fast, into GM with an R&D focus on second and third generation plant 
biotechnology. Potential products from these plants include those producing starch for 
technical applications as well as plants with higher levels of vitamins, and with omega-3-fatty 
acids with claimed potential to prevent cardio-vascular diseases, disputed by some who argue 
that plant omega-3 fatty acids are less beneficial than those from marine sources. 
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The PITA project also concluded that Monsanto and other companies’ initial 
aggressive response to concerns about regulation of the technology backfired and fed into 
increasingly strident anti-GM positions. 
 
To summarise, Chataway et al (2004) identified three distinct strategies among the 
companies they examined: Monsanto, from an early date, and DuPont later with its takeover 
of Pioneer seeds company to add to its agro-chemicals portfolio, invested large amounts of 
shareholder funds in acquisitions – a strategy described by other companies as ‘buying the 
channel to market’ for their chemicals. They also invested heavily in building up their 
technological base in biotechnology. Monsanto in particular, being relatively weak in its 
range of agri-chemical products, radically changed its innovation strategy towards the seeds 
part of the commodity chain  
 
Second, other companies (Zeneca and Novartis Seeds that became Syngenta, also 
Dow and Aventis, later bought by Bayer) tried to capture value in a different way – they 
invested a great deal in the technology and made some acquisitions to give them a reasonable 
‘route to market’ but they did not invest in seed companies or distribution mechanisms to the 
same extent as Monsanto and DuPont. 
 
Third, BASF was a late starter in the late 1990s with different strategies, looking for 
benefits from its agro-chemicals businesses to help it buy into biotechnology bypassing the 
earlier innovation phase of other companies. Bayer then bought Aventis in 2001 to move 
from sixth biggest to largest global agri-chemical company, and BASF has recently signed a 
$1.5bn strategic R&D collaboration with Monsanto to develop higher yield maize, soya, 
cotton and rape. 
 
Over the last decade there has been further concentration in the industry. For example 
the top ten agro-chemical companies in 1997 had merged into six by the mid-2000s, the first 
three headquartered in Europe and next three in the USA (Table 1). Three of these firms also 
control about half of the global proprietary seed market - Monsanto with 23% of global 
market, DuPont with 15% and Syngenta with 9%. All six firms are now conducting seed 
R&D, and all are rapidly increasing R&D spending, whilst agri-chemicals R&D is growing 
much more slowly. 
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Table 1 Top six agrichemical companies and their seeds businesses, 2007 
Company (HQ) Acquisitions and mergers since 1997 Agri-chemical sales, 
2007 (US$m) 
Seed sales, 
2007 (US$m) 
Bayer  
(Germany) 
Bought Aventis (itself a merger between AgrEvo 
(Hoechst and Schering) and Rhone-Poulenc) in 
2001 
7,458 524 (7
th
) 
Syngenta 
(Switzerland) 
Merger between Zeneca (itself a merger between 
ICI and Astra’s agrichemical businesses) and 
Novartis’ agricultural business 
7,285 2,018 (3
rd
) 
BASF  
(Germany) 
Bought American Cyanamid (top ten pesticide 
company) in 2000 
4,297  
Dow AgroSciences 
(USA) 
 3,779  
Monsanto  
(USA) 
Merged with Pharmacia and Upjohn in 2000. Took 
over a significant set of seeds companies from the 
mid-1990s, including leading GM pioneers. Took 
over Seminis (fifth largest global seed company 
and the leading vegetable seed company) in 2005.  
3,599 4,964 (1
st
) 
Du Pont 
(USA) 
Took over Pioneer Hi-Bred seeds in 1999 2,369 3,300 (2
nd
) 
Proportion of global 
market 
 74% 49% 
 
Source: Agrow and authors. 
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After the early 2000s flurry of merger and acquisition activity and the high drama of 
the debates over GMOs (genetically modified organisms), recent years have been relatively 
stable in terms of overall corporate investment and consolidation. R&D expenditure has seen 
a small increase in volume terms with a small decrease as percentage of sales, around 10 
percent, which makes the industry comparatively R&D intensive (Table 2).   
 
Table 2: R&D as a percentage of sales (selected years)  
Company R&D expenditure ($m) R&D as percentage of sales 
 2004  2008  2004  2008 
Syngenta 809  969  11.1  8.3 
BASF 365  325  7.1  9.8 
Monsanto 509  969  9.3  8.5 
Bayer Crop Science 679  649  11.4  10.2 
Dow 335  390 est.  9.9  8.9 est. 
DuPont n.a  660 est.  n.a.  10.1 est. 
 
Source: Authors, from Annual Reports of each company, except for some Dow and DuPont 
data which were estimated from consultant’s reports. 
 
However, the legacy of the debates and decisions of the first decade of this century 
are very evident in terms of geographical distribution of investment in GM R&D. Opposition 
to GM in Europe and a virtual moratorium on the use of GM crops has led companies to 
reassess their plans to develop GM crops for the European market and to lower their R&D in 
European countries. For example, Syngenta’s major research centres are now located in 
Stein, Switzerland; Jealott’s Hill, England; Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA but 
also Goa and Beijing. Syngenta opened its enhanced chemistry centre in Goa in 2006, and in 
2008 a new biotechnology centre in Beijing to concentrate on early stage valuation of 
genetically modified traits for key crops such as maize and soybean in areas such as yield 
improvement, drought resistance and disease control. 
 
Monsanto’s gung-ho strategy has so far paid off. It still dominates commercially 
available GM crop varieties (Table 3).  
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Table 3 Number of commercially approved GM crops by company 
Crop Monsanto Pioneer 
(DuPont 
Bayer/Aventis/ 
AgrEvo 
Syngenta 
Seeds 
BASF 
Maize 18 5 4 12 1 
Cotton 7 - 2 1 - 
Soybean 2 2 4 - - 
 
NB: These include all the traits for the three most dominant biotech crops, 2008.  
Source: www.agbios.com 
 
The number of firms using biotechnology to develop new varieties of plant has 
decreased. The increase in concentration can be gauged from patent and field trial data. 
Between 1990 and 1994 five firms accounted for 36.7 percent of biotechnology plant patents 
granted by the USPTO. The share of the top five firms increased to 80.5 percent between 
2000 and 2004. Between 1995 and 1999, 146 firms applied for at least one GM field trial. 
Ten years later the number declined by almost half to 76 firms between 2005 and 2009 
(Arundel and Sawaya, 2009). Big companies are increasingly undertaking research for 
second generation GM crop products, such as: quality traits (flavour enhancement; better 
processing and feed quality, including animal feed crops tailored to the nutritional 
requirements of different species); improved nutrition in crops such as vegetables and rice (eg 
rice with additional vitamin A and iron; or traits that might lower the incidence of heart 
disease, often described as ‘functional foods’ or ‘nutriceuticals’. The share of research on 
second generation crops has steadily increased. For example, field trials on agronomic traits 
increased from three percent of all field trials in 1990 to 30 percent in 2008 (Arundel and 
Sawaya, 2009). A potential third generation of GM innovations involves plants being used as 
‘factories’ to develop a wider range of chemicals, including pharmaceuticals and bulk 
chemicals.  
 
In conclusion, there has been undoubted concentration and commodity-chain 
integration of seeds, chemicals and biotechnology. The maturation of the agri-chemicals 
industry has led many companies to divide off their higher profit health 
chemicals/biotechnology firms and to invest in the seeds part of the plant commodity-chain, 
so capturing new intellectual property from the combinations. Monsanto’s strategy keeps it as 
the leader in ‘first’ generation GM crops, leaving other companies to ‘catch-up’ and attempt 
to leap-frog into second and third generation technologies. Overall, corporate investment in 
technology has held up well, given the loss of European markets to GM technologies. This 
suggests that companies have not been put off the technology. Their determination to 
dominate key global markets, though, has put them off investing in European facilities.  
 
To our question about corporate concentration, the evidence is strong that a 
technological-economic pathway has been built with consolidated agri-chemical and seed 
businesses, focused on a small number of dominant crops (maize, soya and cotton) owned by 
US and European based multinationals, albeit with Europe becoming a less central location 
for R&D. This, however, does not mean that alternative technological and socio-economic 
trajectories are completely absent.  Whilst the analysis so far might indicate a straightforward 
picture of large corporate dominance - and one resulting in an increasingly intensified 
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agriculture under the control of mainly large farmers, there are other more complicated 
dynamics at play. The following section unpicks some of the complex technological, social, 
economic and political realities. 
 
THE ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF GM  
 
This section examines how agri-biotechnology has affected agricultural production 
processes
4
. What are the benefits and who gains from its adoption? How important is GM 
agri-biotechnology for farming? 
 
Crops ‘in the ground’ 
 
The top three biotech crops in 2008 were: (i) herbicide tolerant soybean (53 percent of global 
GM crop area) and grown commercially in the USA, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Canada, 
Uruguay, South Africa, Mexico and Chile; (ii) maize with stacked (multi-herbicide and 
pesticide) GM traits (20 percent of global area), grown in the USA, Canada, South Africa, the 
Philippines, Honduras, Argentina, and Chile and (iii) pest resistant cotton (9  percent of 
global area) grown in India, China, Brazil, Argentina, USA, Colombia, Mexico, Australia, 
Burkina Faso and South Africa.  
 
These crops are all ‘first generation’. The development of ‘first generation’ GM crops, 
concentrating on input traits such as herbicide, insect pest and disease resistance, is based on 
technology which has been the subject of scientific research for a considerable time and could 
be implemented fairly rapidly. 
 
The fastest diffusion of GM has been in soybean, where GM varieties accounted for 
70 percent of global cultivation of the crop in 2008, with recent increases driven by large 
jumps in soybean production in Latin America. Diffusion of GM into maize began later, but 
more than doubled between 2003 and 2008, reaching 23 percent of global production of GM. 
Later approvals for GM in maize compared with soybean in Brazil (approved for 2008 
harvest) and China (not approved yet) account for some of the difference. GM cotton 
diffusion at 47 per cent in 2008 is estimated to grow rapidly in the next few years (Arundel 
and Sawaya, 2009). A fourth crop (rapeseed/canola) reached 18 percent of global area in 
2008, but its expansion is less rapid than the other crops because approval has been slower 
and the USA is a relatively small producer. 
 
Geography of GM 
 
Despite the rapid spread of GM crops across the globe, and particularly in some developing 
countries, the area under GM crops is still dominated by a handful of countries. Certainly the 
geography of GM crop adoption is extremely uneven and has not followed a 
straightforwardly north-south divide. The USA, of course, has been the first and prime 
adopter. There, the GM share of total area planted of three key field crops in 2009 was 91 
percent for soybean, 88 percent for cotton and 85 percent for maize (Arundel and Sawaya, 
2009). Given the small but growing demand for organic and traditional varieties, farmer take-
up of GM in those crops is close to saturation in the USA.  
 
                                                 
4
 This article focuses mainly on transgenic biotechnologies (GM). However, some data on agri-biotechnology 
integrates all biotechnology, including non-transgenic breeding methods, such as marker assisted selection and 
related technologies, tissue culture and biopesticides that use insects or microorganisms to attack plant pests. 
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However, as is universally known, European countries have not followed the GM 
route, though there has been significant adoption of non-GM biotechnologies such as marker 
assisted breeding. In 2008, 92 percent of all GM crops globally were grown in just five 
countries - the USA, Argentina, Brazil, India and Canada - as shown in table 4. Outside of the 
‘all or nothing’ North America and Europe, take-up has been uneven and data quite difficult 
to analyze. 
 
In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil are the dominant GM crop producers, and by 
2008 nine countries had planted commercial crops, the vast majority either cotton or maize 
and soybean, mostly grown for animal feed rather than for direct human consumption. By 
2005, 65 percent of maize hectarage in Argentina was planted with GM Seeds. The social 
relations of GM production in Latin America have not been well researched though the 
geography and nature of the crops indicates that production is by capitalist farmers, including 
corporate farming enterprises (James, 2008, for Argentina and Brazil). 
 
In Asia, commercial cultivation has been slower. India and China (cotton) and, to a 
lesser extent Philippines (maize) were the only producers in 2008. In the large Asian 
countries, indeed, there is a big gap between research and field trials of GM and its use in 
commercial production. That is, research and development has not translated into significant 
technology adoption. A number of reasons have been given for this. First, negative consumer 
opinion towards GM food is suggested by the focus on cotton in India and China (Arundel 
and Sawaya 2009). Much Asian R&D concerns rice where the next few years will reveal 
whether GM varieties reach the consumer. The second reason may be the important export 
markets in Europe, Japan and Korea, where there are very strict regulations concerning GM 
foods and adventitious presence
5
. This does not seem to affect crops for animal feed – there 
are large exports of GM maize and soybean from Latin America and the USA to Korea, 
Japan and Europe, for example. But such barriers to GM foods for direct human consumption 
may become a factor as GM rice seeds become widely available. 
 
The most recent estimates from the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications (ISAAA) show that in 2008, some 13.3 million farmers from 25 
countries planted up to 125 million hectares of biotech crops. The majority of these farmers, 
12.3 million or 90 percent were from ‘southern countries’, including larger capitalist 
producers in Latin America, but also smaller producers in China, India, and the Philippines 
and also to an extent South Africa (James 2008). James estimates that in China there are 
around seven million farmers growing Bt cotton developed by the Chinese agricultural 
research system. In India around five million farmers planted 7.6 million hectares of Bt 
cotton in 2008. Adoption of Bt cotton in India has been rapid, rising from around 10 percent 
in 2005 to over 70 percent of total cotton in 2008 (ISAAA, 2009). ISAAA argues that 
pesticide use has also dropped – it reports studies from India of decreases of 39%. These and 
other data are contested by others, who suggest that smaller farmers have not gained to the 
same extent as large producers (Glover 2009)
6
. In Africa, South Africa is by far the dominant 
                                                 
5
 One new growth industry arising from GM is that of instrument technology to verify percentage content of 
GM. The demands in Europe, Japan, Korea, and other countries for no-GM, or very low percentage GM, has led 
to a new high-tech precision industry that did not exist before.  
 
6
 As an indicator of the ‘heat’ and polemic associated with research on GM crops: in the same article Glover 
accused the Reading University group of Morse, Thirtle et al of collusion with Monsanto and Vunisa in South 
Africa and Monsanto and Mahyco in India, citing their acknowledgement of ‘logistical’ support.  Glover 2009, 
36) suggests that ‘ it is hard to believe that the involvement of Mahyco, Monsanto and Vunisa personnel in the 
process of selecting research locations, facilitating the researchers’ access to the field and directly in the data 
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GM producer, and also accounts for 82 percent of field trials and thus likely future 
commercialization. Other countries are beginning to commercialize, including Egypt (Bt 
maize) and Burkina Faso (Bt cotton). 
 
Table 4 Area of GM crops by country (million hectares)  
Country  2007 2008 
USA 57.7 62.5 
Argentina 19.1 21.0 
Brazil 15.0 15.8 
India 6.2 7.6 
Canada 7.0 7.6 
China 3.8 3.8 
Paraguay 2.6 2.7 
South Africa 1.8 1.8 
Uruguay 0.5 0.7 
Bolivia -- 0.6 
Philippines 0.3 0.4 
Australia 0.1 0.2 
Mexico 0.1 0.1 
Spain 0.1 0.1 
 
NB: Limited to countries that produced more than 50,000 ha of GM crops in 2008. Source: 
adapted from James 2008. 
 
Who benefits from GM crops? 
 
The global value of GM crops in 2008 was estimated at US$ 7.5 billion; accounting for 14 
percent of global commercial crop production and 22 percent of the global commercial seed 
market. 76 per cent of this global biotech market (US$ 5.7 billion) was in advanced capitalist 
countries and the remaining 24 percent (US$ 1.8 billion) in countries of the South (James, 
2008).  
 
Case studies, albeit at small scale, of the economic benefits of Bt-cotton to 
smallholder farmers in South Africa (Ismael, Bennet and Morse, 2001) and India (Zilberman, 
Ameden and Qaim, 2007) have argued the potential of GM crops to bring higher yields, more 
income for those farmers who are cultivating them and also improved health and 
environmental benefits. A socio-economic study conducted by Huang et al (2005) in Hubei 
                                                                                                                                                        
collection did not have any impact on the data collected and perhaps also on the way it was analysed and 
interpreted’. These accusations have been vehemently denied and ISAAA has attempted to counter them  
with further data in its 2009 article. Clearly, more data are required to add light to the heat in this debate.  
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province on two varieties of rice, GM Xianyou 63
7
 and GM II-Youming 86
8
, suggested 
significant benefits of these varieties to farmers. They have reported insect-resistant GM rice 
yields as six to nine percent higher than conventional varieties with 80 percent reduction in 
pesticide usage besides reduced adverse health effects. Extensive state-by-state results for 
cotton in the USA also suggested significantly reduced pesticide use (Marra, Pardey and 
Alston 2002).  
 
Extensive assessments have been carried out over several years by Brookes and 
Barfoot, the latest (2009) focusing on the global socio-economic and environmental impacts 
of GM crops in the first 12 years of their commercial use (1996-2007). They estimated that in 
2007, direct global farm income from GM crops totalled $ 10.1 billion representing 4.4 
percent added to the value of global production of the four main GM crops: soybean, maize, 
rapeseed and cotton. Since 1996, there has been cumulative farm income growth totalling 
$44.1 billion from GM crops. Their latest assessment (Table 5) suggests that (‘developing’) 
countries in the south (predominantly Argentina, Brazil, India, China, Paraguay and South 
Africa) accounted for about 58 percent of total farm income benefits whilst advanced 
capitalist (‘developed’) country farmers derived about 42 percent of the benefits.  
 
 
Table 5: GM crop farm income benefits, 2007 ($ million). 
Crop Developing Developed 
GM HT soybeans 2,561 1,375 
GM IR maize 302 1,773 
GM HT maize 41 402 
GM IR cotton 2,918 286 
GM HT cotton 8 16 
GM VR papaya and squash 0 54 
Total 5,830 4,252 
 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot  2009. 
 
Brookes and Barfoot (2009) estimated that the costs farmers pay for accessing GM 
technologies (Table 6) across the four main crops was equal to 24 percent of the total 
technology gains.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Created to be resistant to stem borer and leaf roller; it was developed by insertion of the Chinese-created Bt 
gene. 
 
8
 Also resistant to stem borer but developed by inserting a modified cowpea trypsin inhibitor (CpTI) gene into 
rice. 
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Table 6: Cost of accessing GM technology relative to total farm income benefits, 2007 ($ 
million) 
Crop Cost of 
technology: 
all farmers 
Farm 
income 
gain: all 
farmers 
Total 
benefit of 
technology 
to farmers 
and seed 
supply 
chain 
Cost of 
technology: 
developing 
countries 
Farm 
income 
gain: 
developing 
countries 
Total technology 
gain to farmers 
and seed supply 
chain: developing 
countries 
GM HT 
soybeans 
931 3,936 4,866 326 2,561 2,887 
GM IR 
maize 
714 2,075 2,790 79 302 381 
GM HT 
maize 
531 442 973 20 41 61 
GM IR 
cotton 
670 3,204 3,874 535 2,918 3,453 
GM HT 
cotton 
226 25 251 9 8 17 
GM HT 
canola 
102 346 448 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 3,174 10,027 13,202 969 5,830 6,798 
 
NB: Cost of accessing the technology is based on seed premiums paid by farmers for using 
GM technology relative to conventional equivalents; Total farm income gain excludes $26 
million associated with virus resistant crops in the US.  
Source: Brookes and Barfoot 2009.  
 
Although Brookes and Barfoot explain their data gathering methods and analysis in 
detail, their estimates involve generalisations. Their data, and other data that suggest GM 
crops bring benefits, are contested by others like Glover (2009, 8) who argue that ‘those 
benefits are neither as simple, as uniform, as context-independent or as sizeable as they have 
frequently been depicted to be’. He suggests considerable variability in farmer income from 
Bt cotton in India, with results to show that some ‘resource-poor’ farmers were doing much 
worse than others. There is clearly a need for better research on the socially differentiated 
results of cultivation of GM crops by different classes of agrarian producers.  
 
Technology 
 
Those who championed GM in the early days argued that ‘first generation’ was just the 
beginning and that the real breakthroughs would come from ‘second’ and ‘third’ generation 
technologies. Early R&D was almost as much on stress tolerance as on herbicide/pest 
resistance. However, almost all commercial crops at present are ‘first generation’: either 
herbicide tolerant, or pesticide tolerant, or a ‘stacked’ combination of these two traits. Second 
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generation products make up a tiny proportion of commercial production, though approval is 
pending for drought tolerant maize. 
 
The focus on two dominant first generation traits in a small number of crops has led to 
increasing corporate concentration. An important consideration is that the innovation cycle in 
agri-chemicals is extremely long: ten to 15 years is not uncommon, thus research being 
conducted today will take at least a decade to commercial realization. As yet there is no 
evidence to suggest that second and third generation crops might be technologically and 
economically disruptive in dramatically transforming farming practices. It is possible that in 
some applications scale economics might be different. For biofuels, for example, the cost 
(economic and environmental) of getting biomass (the feedstock for fuel generation) to 
processing plants introduces limits to the benefits of scale. More generally, the lack so far of 
more sophisticated and higher generation plant material in terms of both input and output 
traits, has resulted in lack of applications of traits specifically to address agricultural 
problems such as drought resistance and anti-salinity. 
 
To summarise, GM crops are increasingly important and can provide decreasing 
chemicals costs and increasing farm incomes. The benefits so far, however, are associated 
with a small group of (albeit important) crops, for a relatively small number of farmers, in a 
few, mostly large, producing countries. Unfortunately, there is a major gap in research data 
on the differentiated nature of GM production. There are a range of micro-studies concerning 
the nature of production, which suggest that smaller-scale capitalist producers are important 
in India and parts of South Africa, but there is no information to support reliable 
generalisation. Second and third generation crops are increasing as a proportion of field trials, 
but have not been adopted in any significant extent as yet. And, as yet, research and 
development as not focused on major agricultural problems like drought. 
 
BEYOND THE DOMINANT NARRATIVES 
 
Given the significant advance of GM technology and the increasing dominance of the large 
agri-chemicals/seeds corporations in the last decade, it may seem perverse to argue that there 
might be alternatives. Prevailing criticisms of transgenic crops emphasize the monopolization 
of R&D by the private sector, largely multinational companies (MNCs) that generate 
proprietary technologies guarded by strict patents with negative effects for consumers and 
many producers. 
 
This section examines what scope might exist for alternatives beyond the GM 
trajectory we have mapped above. We consider three aspects. Are there alternatives that may 
bring benefits to a broader range of farmers and also to consumers? Can public R&D and 
investment generate alternatives? And are there ways of delivering benefits in different ways? 
These are questions typically, if not always, ruled out by dominant eco-populist narratives 
about agricultural biotechnology.  
 
Beyond the USA to the BICAs 
 
We have shown that, although GM has been taken-up most dramatically in the USA, there 
has recently been a geographical shift associated with GM crops with India, China, Brazil and 
Argentina becoming major players. Although the technology is most often associated with 
large MNCs, the social and economic impact has brought benefits to producers in several 
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large southern countries. Whether benefits can be spread more widely depends to an extent 
on the development of alternative capabilities. 
 
Our preliminary analysis of recent research from a wider range of sources suggests 
that this may be the case and that there are other drivers of new plant biotechnology. One 
pattern features public research and a more public approach to farmer take-up and agrarian 
futures. Second are explicit attempts to introduce a different politics more oriented to the 
needs of low income producers and consumers. These alternative approaches have the 
potential to change the nature of second and third generation crops; to change the geography 
of GM agriculture (further) away from US and other large-scale, highly capitalized farmers; 
and to challenge commodity-chain dominance by large corporations, for example, by 
contesting the intellectual property rights regimes they seek to impose and enforce.. Added 
pressure by multilateral agencies and a variety of other bodies to address food shortages 
could add to the momentum behind approaches to bring a wider variety of producers and 
consumers into a more varied framework of plant biotechnology innovation.  
 
Until recently, there have been some extremely effective political movements against 
the cultivation of any kind of GM crop, whether publicly or privately funded. On one hand, in 
a recent incarnation of anti-GM analysis Vanloqueren and Baret (2009) argue that present 
transgenic and chemical intensive technological trajectories lock out agro-ecological 
innovations and they go on to argue for a new systemic agro-ecological approach.  On the 
other hand, in the past year there were several high profile reports urging increased 
investment in agricultural science and in plant biotechnology including GM, for example a  
Royal Society report (2009). Such reports stress that facilitating increased food production in 
developing countries is not only important for people who live there but vital for the world 
economy as prices for food will increase globally if investments in raising the productivity of 
food farming are not made. 
 
Public research 
 
While the large agri-chemical and seeds MNCs invest immense resources in R&D, especially 
for new transgenic crop varieties, this recognition tends to mask the important role of public 
sector research (research institutes and universities), the international agricultural research 
centres (mostly the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, CGIAR) and 
local, developing country companies. As Pray and Naseem (2007: 194) noted: ‘in total, 
there’s more private than public research but the public sector still plays a large role, which 
sometimes is overlooked in the debates about biotech research.’  
 
The share of public sector field trials in all GM trials has increased a little recently to 
21 percent in the period 2004-8 (Arundel and Dawaya, 2009). The public sector does more 
than its share of field trials on second generation traits than the private with greater focus on 
agronomic traits and crops with smaller markets. 
  
China, India, Brazil and Argentina are already key players in transgenic technologies 
R&D. In these countries public sector funding to biotechnology research has been substantial 
(Herring 2007b; Cohen 2005; Spielman, Cohen and Zambrano 2006). Another source of agri-
biotech R&D is the CGIAR system which is estimated to invest some US$ 25 million 
annually in agbiotech research (see World Bank 2004, quoted in Spielman et al 2006). We 
use the cases of GM development in China and the CG centres’ biotechnology focus to 
illustrate these public trajectories.  
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Global data on public sector spending on biotechnology R&D is scanty but studies 
suggest that in 1999, China spent over US$ 100 million in agricultural biotechnology 
research (Huang et al 2002 quoted in Pray et al, 2007). In July 2008, China’s State Council 
approved a research initiative to launch a 20 billion RNB (approximately US$ 300 million) 
programme for GM crops (Shen, personal communication.). Shen’s research (forthcoming) 
makes a persuasive case for China leading in transgenic rice technology, with a range of 
transgenic varieties under trial. The Chinese government has placed considerable emphasis 
on the role of the public sector in biotechnology research as Keeley (2006 quoted in Shen 
forthcoming) has summarised: 
 
A key feature of Chinese biotechnology policy processes is that biotechnology 
research and development is overwhelmingly a public sector project. Most research is 
not carried out by private corporations, and most applications for commercialisation 
of GM crops do not come from private companies. The majority of risk assessment 
applications are for technologies that are the outputs of research projects funded by 
the major public science funding bodies, and carried out by National Key 
Laboratories in state institutes (particularly institutes under the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Agricultural 
Universities, as well as some other key universities). This is a major contrast with 
development of GMOs in other countries where most applications come from life 
science companies.  
 
The case of GM rice development in China (Shen, op cit) illustrates this public sector 
focus. The China Rice Functional Genomics Programme was initiated in 1999 under the 
National Biosciences Initiatives and funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of 
China. By early 2002 Chinese scientists had completed mapping the rice genome. By 2005, 
China’s biotechnology programme had generated a wide array of new technologies including 
several GM varieties (Huang et al, 2005). Several of these GM varieties have undergone 
successful field and environmental trials and four varieties were recommended for pre-
production trials in farmers’ fields (ibid). 
 
The CGIAR focuses on biotechnology, including transgenic, R&D for developing 
countries. Table 7 provides a summary of the transgenic research projects at the CGIAR as of 
2008 (Okusu, 2009). It shows that nine of the 15 CGIAR Centres were conducting biotech 
research on some 15 different crops focusing on a variety of traits. Most of these are at 
various laboratory stages, with only a few that have progressed to field trials and no 
commercial releases so far. However, the Golden Rice Project under IRRI has begun its first 
outdoor trials in Asia and approvals for release are expected in 2011.  
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Table 7: Summary of transgenic research at CGIAR centres  
CGIAR 
Centre 
Crop Trait (resistance) Research 
Bioversity Musa Pests (weevils, 
nematodes); disease 
Gene discovery and characterization; 
transformation 
CIAT Beans Agronomic Transformation (particle bombardment and 
Agrobacterium); back-crossing on wild 
species; biosafety greenhouse 
 Cassava Insect;  
modified starch;  
early flowering,  
Beta carotene 
Transformation (agrobacterium) of clones 
used by small scale farmers; field trials 
 Rice 
 
Virus, disease 
Abiotic stress (flood; 
acid; high elevation) 
Drought  
Field trials 
Transformation (agrobacterium) of recalcitrant 
cultivar with target trait 
Gene discovery (with CIMMYT and IRRI) 
CIMMYT Maize 
 
Insect (Bt) 
 
Gene characterization (target insect 
specificity); transformation and conventional 
backcrossing; biosafety containment and 
confinement 
 Wheat Drought 
 
 
 
Agronomic 
Transcription factor/promoter characterization 
Genetic molecular analysis for transmission 
and expression 
 
Transformation system development 
(Agrobacterium) 
lCIP Potato 
 
Insect (Bt) 
Disease 
Cultivar development; field trials 
Cultivar development 
 Sweet 
potato 
Virus 
Insect  
Modified starch 
Cultivar development 
Gene discovery and characterization 
Cultivar development; field trials 
ICARDA Chickpea Disease, abiotic stress Transformation (Agrobacterium) 
 Lentil Disease, abiotic stress Transformation (Agrobacterium) 
 Barley Disease, abiotic stress 
 
Transformation (Agrobacterium); variety 
development 
 Wheat  
 
Abiotic stress (salt, 
drought) 
Gene discovery and characterization; 
Transformation (Agrobacterium 
ICRISAT Groundnut Disease, virus Tissue culture protocol; small scale field trials 
 Pigeonpea Insect (Bt) Tissue culture protocol; small scale field trials 
 Sorghum Insect (Bt) Tissue culture protocol 
IITA Musa  Virus, bacteria, fungus Transformation (Agrobacterium)  
 Cassava Virus Transformation 
 Cowpea Insect (Bt) Transformation 
IRRI Rice Blight, insect (Bt); beta 
Carotene 
Transformation 
Cultivar development; contained field trial 
 
Source: Okusu 2009 
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There are collaborative (cross-centre) projects as Okusu (2009, 73) reports: 
 
The Generation Challenge Program
9
 combines genomics with molecular 
biology tools with the aim of developing improved crop varieties, with a focus on 
abiotic stress tolerance, particularly drought tolerance.  The Harvest Plus Challenge 
Program
10
 breeding technologies, including transformation, aims to breed staple foods 
fortified in micronutrients such as vitamin A, Zinc and iron. 
 
The CG centres have also championed a range of public-private partnerships for 
agbiotech research (see Table 8 below). Spielman et al (2006) use the term public-private 
partnership to mean any collaboration involving both public and private institutions so their 
data encompass a wide range of initiatives, including many where the private contribution is 
to ‘donate’ seed in which intellectual property rights have been registered. 
 
The CG centres’ new initiatives have had mixed success. Vroom (2009) analyses the 
Generation Challenge programme, for example, as an innovation in the ways the CG centres 
can link upstream science-led genomics research and downstream breeding programmes. The 
Generation Challenge programme sets out to uncover the genetic mechanism of drought 
tolerance in crops and thus to contribute to agricultural development for ‘resource poor 
farmers’ and in arid regions. This large programme attempts both to do basic science and to 
build new systems of innovation that include farmers from the very beginning at all stages of 
the process. Vroom (2009) shows how difficult it is to build meaningful involvement of 
farmers in upstream science and suggests that it might be more fruitful to acknowledge the 
difficulties of ‘engaging farmers with the basic science’ and instead to incorporate the interest 
of farmers in more downstream activities. 
 
The CG centres have begun to reorient their research from more ‘science-based’ to 
more ‘farmer-oriented’. For example, Puente-Rodriguez (2008) has studied CG research on 
molecular markers and local potato diversity in Bolivia. He analyses what he sees as two 
contradictory approaches to this research: biodiversity understood as raw material and as 
cultural material. The former is a genomics that uses local potatoes as raw materials without 
any intrinsic value and in which farmers’ varieties can be freely used as breeding inputs to 
develop commercial varieties, while the latter is a different type of genomics which handles 
native varieties as final entities constructed by farmers. Puente-Rodriguez suggests that both 
approaches are being used in the Wiphala project to develop native varieties for commercial 
purposes - an attempt to connect genomics and Andean small scale agriculture to produce a 
new genomics. 
 
Finally, Vroom (2008) describes attempts by a public-private partnership to produce 
‘pro-poor’ transgenic cabbages in India that involve redesign of the technology, based on Bt 
brassica but with strong local ‘stewardship’ of the varieties. The research at least shows that 
there is some room for manoeuvre. 
                                                 
9
 See http://www.generationcp.org  
 
10
 See http://www.harvestplus.org 
19 
 
Table 8: Public private partnerships in the CGIAR on agribiotech research, past and present 
Research topic/project title 
CGIAR 
Centres 
Partners 
Apomixis 
 
CIMMYT 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International (Du Pont); 
Syngenta; Limagrain (France); others 
Golden Rice Humanitarian 
Board 
IRRI 
Syngenta; Rockefeller Foundation; Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology; others 
HarvestPlus CIAT; IFPRI Syngenta 
Unlocking crop genetic 
diversity for poor people 
CIMMYT; 
IPGRI; IRRI 
MAHAYCO; Bayer Crop Science; Pioneer Hi-
Bred International (Du Pont); national and 
international agricultural research organizations; 
advanced research institutes etc 
Agronatura science park CIAT 
Private seed companies; Colombian university 
biotech laboratories, Colombian national 
commodity research centres etc 
Potato/sweet potato 
transformation 
CIP Plant Genetic Systems; Axis Genetics; Monsanto 
Genomics for livestock 
vaccine research 
ILRI 
Merial; The Institute of Genomic Research; 
others 
Bt Genes for Rice 
transformation 
IRRI 
Novartis; Plantech and a consortium of public 
research institutes 
Positive selection for cassava 
transformation 
CIAT Novartis 
Biotech Incubator ICRISAT Private biotech companies 
Fish Genetic Research 
World Fish 
Centre 
A private biotechnology company; GIFT 
foundation international 
Research on mimitop-
virosome approach 
ILRI Pevion Biotech 
Enzyme-linked 
immunosorbant assay (ELISA) 
for tick-born diseases 
ILRI Savanona Biotech 
 
Source: Spielman, Cohen and Zambrano 2006 
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The findings of Cohen (2005) on the role of public sector research in the development 
of GM crops in the developing countries map multiple trajectories of biotechnology research 
and also demonstrate that developing countries are not just consumers of R&D developed in 
the North but are also actively engaging in transgenic research. Cohen has reported on a study 
of some 201 transformation events of 45 different crops in 15 countries in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa.
11
 The largest number of events (109) was carried out by seven Asian 
countries (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand), followed 
by four African countries (Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe) with a total of 54 
transformation events and four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and 
Mexico)  for which 38 transformation events were reported. It is striking, perhaps, that  
 the World Development Report 2008 (World Bank 2007) exhorted greater public sector 
engagement in agricultural R&D in developing countries, largely to make up for what it 
judged to be a failure of the private sector to do enough to produce improved crops for poor 
farmers (Woodhouse 2009). In late 2009, the Gates Foundation committed a further $120m to 
agricultural development, mostly in Africa, citing the need to assist small farmers. 
 
Technology access, regulation and economic benefits 
 
One important question in considering this more complicated picture of who benefits 
from GM is what different classes of farmers in developing countries gain from the use of 
these plant biotechnologies. Although it is hard to build a comprehensive picture of the 
differentiated nature of GM technology adoption, there is significant pressure at least from 
some capitalist farmers, larger and smaller in scale, in some developing countries to become a 
part of the process of development of GM crops. 
 
A dominant criticism of transgenic plant technology concerns intellectual property 
rights (mainly patents) in seeds with the effect that farmers are likely to be held ‘hostage’ by 
MNCs with devastating effects on developing countries. Examples from Bt cotton in India 
suggest that ‘farmers’ are not the ‘passive, helpless victims of technology’ they are so often 
framed to be but rather ‘active, powerful users of technology’ who are not only able to ‘pick 
and mix’ the range of technologies available to them (Herring, 2007b) but can pull enough 
clout to influence policy decisions. Besides, farmers continue to innovate, to adapt the 
technologies to their settings and as the Indian story shows, have come up with their own 
‘varieties’ which they are able to replicate. 12 
 
Shen (forthcoming) has noted that the controversies surrounding the GM debate has 
slowed down, perhaps even derailed, adoption of GM rice in China. In response to the 
mounting international pressure from anti-GM campaigners, the Chinese government 
established a biosafety technical committee (consisting only of scientists) under the Ministry 
of Agriculture. In 2004, a new higher level pan-ministerial committee was set up to oversee 
biosafety issues, which has not approved any variety of transgenic seeds so far. Shen suggests 
that this committee is hostage to international organizations championing opposing views on 
GM technologies. This apparent regulatory bottleneck notwithstanding, Chinese farmers are 
                                                 
11
 An event defined as a stable transformation i.e. the incorporation of a foreign DNA into a living plant cell (by 
a single institute) thereby providing a unique crop and trait combination. 
 
12
 At the same time, we must acknowledge that Herring’s argument is highly controversial in India, and that the 
‘farmers’ in his case studies appear to be small-scale capitalists. One key question, then, which Herring and his 
co-workers have not researched is whether the adoption of GM crops (principally cotton in the case of India) 
reflects, and indeed further intensifies, tendencies of class differentiation in the countryside.  
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reported to have planted GM rice in Hubei province without approval. Jia Hepeng (2005), 
quoting Greenpeace China, claimed that GM rice seeds were being sold and grown illegally 
in central China’s Hubei province, contrary to an official government ban. Greenpeace China 
claimed that 19 out of the 25 samples collected from the local rice market were confirmed to 
contain DNA genetically modified by a Germany-based laboratory Genescan and could have 
originated from one of the Chinese universities. Apparently, these claims - similar to those 
about the use of ‘illegal seeds in India’ (Herring, 2007b) have been confirmed by many 
organizations in the West as well as media reports in China (Xiaobai Shen, personal 
communication). A similar incapacity to impose controls was ecountered by the state 
government of Rio Grande do Sul state in Brazil when  it tried to prevent cultivation of GM 
soya in 2000-1, in line with EU bans on GM soya imports, but GM seed coming across the 
border from Argentina enabled farmers to circumvent the ban (Philip Woodhouse, personal 
communication).  
 
These examples raise some interesting issues about the effectiveness of regulatory 
regimes in developing countries.  First, regulatory costs are highest for GM plant varieties, 
ranging between UD$ 0.4 million and US$ 13.5 million per variety. Each new crop release is 
estimated to cost between US$ 1.2m and 3 million (OECD, 2009). These high costs can focus 
research onto a narrow group of key crops. Such costs might influence the ability of farmers 
to adopt GM technologies. There is some evidence, however, that intellectual property 
regimes can be subverted by producer resistance. Roy, Herring and Geisler (2007) record that 
in September 2001 a massive bollworm infestation struck Gujarat and devastated all hybrid 
cotton varieties except Navbharat 151 (NB151), an unapproved locally produced Bt variety. 
Following investigations, Mahayco-Monsanto Biotech Ltd (MMBL) determined that NB151 
contained the cry1Ac gene for pest control patented by Monsanto. MMBL charged that 
Navbharat Seeds Limited (a local company) had been selling NB151 illegally for the 
previous three years and demanded punitive action against it.  India’s Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC) consequently issued orders to the Gujarat Biotechnology 
Coordination Committee to ‘burn all illegal plantations, sequester the crop and sterilize the 
fields’. However, the orders were never implemented due to resistance from farmers and the 
Gujarat state government. 
 
Herring (2007b, 133) noted that ‘appropriately enough, Gujarat’s decision to do 
nothing to enforce the order was announced in Delhi by the Union Minister for Textiles’ 
emphasizing the influence of political disputes surrounding the emotive issue of the Bt cotton 
ban. Interestingly, both the Union Minister for Textiles and the Chief Minister of Gujarat 
pointed an accusing finger at a different target: the pesticide industry lobby group for its 
‘interest in depriving farmers of the benefit of technology’. Farmers became the victors in 
this stand-off when the state and national governments declared that ‘farmers’ interests 
wouldn’t be harmed’.  
 
The farmers’ victory in Gujarat provided the much needed push for the immediate 
approval of Bt cotton in India. As Herring (2007b, 134) recounts: 
 
On March 2002, farmer representatives led by Sharad Joshi – a member of the 
Kisan (agriculturalist) coordination committee (KCC) – threatened to launch a civil 
disobedience movement if Bt cotton were not approved by Delhi. KCC 
representatives from cotton-growing states across India – Gujarat, Maharashta, Punjab 
and Andhra Pradesh – rallied for immediate approval, and threatened to cultivate 
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transgenic varieties whether or not the government approved. The following day, 26 
March, the GEAC approved three varieties of the Mahayco – Monsanto Bt cotton. 
 
The case of Bt cotton in India is a clear demonstration of the countervailing power of 
(rich) farmer unions in their struggles against the imposition of corporate power and strict 
(official) regulation of technology. If farmers are properly mobilized, they can influence 
political/regulatory decisions in their favour, depending on what their interests are. In this 
case, they ‘forced’ government to expedite the approval of transgenic varieties. Of course, 
this influence could also be used to ‘stop’ the approval of the technology if the farmers’ 
interests are threatened.
13
 
 
Herring (2007b, 134) states that ‘It is clear that a cottage industry of transgenic pocket 
breeding has grown up around descendants of the original Navbharat 151 seeds’. This 
‘cottage industry has grown due to the challenges that farmers faced following the ban of the 
NB 151 in 2001’. He continues: 
 
Given the high cost of official seeds and the scarcity of the very effective NB 
151, farmers themselves began breeding new transgenic hybrid varieties. They use 
Navbharat 151 seeds for the male contribution and a local variety suited to their 
agronomic conditions as female. From this process, a new Gujarati word has been 
hybridised: ‘Navbharat variants’. ...These locally backcrossed hybrids made by 
farmers are sold by local merchants. … . There are as well farmer-to-farmer 
transactions of modified and crossed transgenic seeds with no names.  
 
This kind of innovation appears to be in the interests of some farmers, but is resisted 
by those MNCs who argue that they have invested heavily in R&D and will fight to hold on 
to intellectual property rights for transgenic varieties. Indeed, intellectual property rights 
issues will be a continuing battle-field for change both from those fighting for ‘open source’ 
(see Kloppenburg in this special issue) and those insisting on tightening rights as new 
molecular GM traits are stacked into products. 
 
In summary, in the face of increased corporate concentration and integration of the 
agri-chemical seed commodity chain, there is evidence of publicly funded R&D that focuses 
more squarely on agronomic traits, some concerning key issues like drought and saline 
resistance and nutrition. There is also evidence of alternatives to corporate patenting 
restrictions, from the major research programmes of China and the CG centres, resistance 
from farmers to restrictions on GM crop breeding, and GM seed replication and use. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The commercialization of the first generation of GM crops has brought concentration and 
commodity-chain integration of seeds, chemicals and biotechnology. Agri-chemical 
companies have invested into the seeds part of the plant commodity-chain, so capturing new 
intellectual property from the integration of GM seed and chemicals. Monsanto’s radical 
                                                 
13
 We have focused here on farmers who have pushed for GM crops to be made available to them, but there are 
others who have mobilized against the planting of GM crops, as reported by Scoones (2008) and Newall (2008). 
Their research has shown that anti-GM alliances are made up of diverse and changing groups. Such alliances, 
they suggest, are less concerned with the pros and cons of a particular set of technologies than with inserting 
GM into a wider debate about ‘the future of agriculture and small-scale farmers, about corporate control and 
property rights and about the rules of global trade’ (Scoones 2008, 315).  
23 
 
strategy has kept it as the leader in ‘first’ generation GM crops, leaving other companies to 
‘catch-up’ and attempt to leap-frog into second and third generation technologies. The large 
companies have stuck with GM technology in the face of massive resistance in Europe. Their 
determination to dominate it in key global markets, though, has lowered their investment in 
their European R&D bases.  
 
GM crops are increasingly important but the benefits so far are associated with a 
small group of (albeit important) crops, for a relatively small number of farmers, in a few, 
mostly large, producing countries. In the US, the market for GM in soybean and maize is 
close to saturation. Publicly funded R&D is partly directed to key agronomic issues like 
drought and saline resistance and nutrition, but there has been no commercialization to date. 
There is also evidence of alternatives to corporate patenting restrictions, from the major 
research programmes of China and the CG centres to resistance from farmers to restrictions 
on GM crops breeding. 
 
There has been little research on the class differentiation of GM producers. Those, 
typically better-off farmers and agricultural corporations who take up GM do so because they 
obtain improved economic benefits. There is a range of (contested) micro-studies which 
suggest that smaller-scale capitalist producers are important in India and parts of South 
Africa in taking up GM crops, but no generalizable information. We would emphasize, 
however, that debate about the potential of GM to raise productivity in farming should not be 
deflected by the classic populist preoccupation with what is best for, or can ‘save’, the 
poorest farmers in the South. To make this the principal criterion for assessing any technical 
change (and indeed social change) in agriculture is to undermine our understanding of the 
history of agricultural advances in the modern world, in the same way that the anti-scientism 
of more radical ‘eco-populism’ does. 
 
To go beyond these conclusions suggests an urgent agenda of future work that 
addresses the weaknesses of research to date. There is a serious lack of evidence on the class 
differentiated nature of GM technology take-up and benefits. The critique of GM is typically 
limited solely to biotechnology in agricultural production and homogenizes ‘farmers’ versus 
the myriad ways in which different classes of farmers organize their production and 
reproduction (Woodhouse 2009). A second weakness is the need to address the ways in 
which changes to intellectual property rights and other regulatory issues might open up 
innovation in GM and related technologies to broaden both the range of GM crops available 
and their delivery and accessibility to various categories of farmers. 
 
The ‘corporate’ drivers of GM have focused their research on existing technological 
characteristics – two traits dominate. But as the technology becomes more widely applied, 
trajectories are being influenced by other forces, including those of governments and farm 
lobbies in the larger ‘middle-income’ countries. Our evidence suggests that GM technology is 
not determined into some indefinite future, that its control and direction can be changed as it 
evolves into new generations. 
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